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What Do Voters Want From Their Local MP? 
NICK VIVYAN and MARKUS WAGNER 
 
Abstract 
This article summarises the findings from a study of what constituents want from their local 
Member of Parliament (MP).
1
 We make use of a survey technique known as conjoint analysis, 
wherein we present a national sample of British voters with profiles of hypothetical MPs who 
vary randomly in their characteristics, activities and behaviour. We find that voters like MPs 
who are independent from the party line and who do not focus exclusively on national policy 
work. MPs’ gender and experience matter far less to constituents. Overall, voters want a 
Parliament made up of strong-minded MPs who see their role as that of a constituency 
representative. This has important implications for parliamentary democracy in Britain. 
 
Keywords: constituency service; Members of Parliament; rebellion; representation; survey 
experiments  
 
 
The job of a Member of Parliament (MP) does not come with a clear description of tasks and 
duties. Indeed, research carried out in the UK and elsewhere has consistently found that 
parliamentary representatives differ, often quite substantially, in how they interpret their role 
and carry out their work.
2
 For example, MPs vary in how they decide to allocate time and 
effort to various activities. Some parliamentarians are known for being policy specialists who 
are highly active in parliament; others direct their attention away from Westminster and 
toward their constituents, working assiduously on casework or vociferously backing local 
campaigns. Similarly, when it comes to party discipline, party whips would agree that some 
MPs deserve gold stars for model behaviour while other MPs often speak out or vote in ways 
that go against the party line. 
But while we may have a good idea as to how MPs choose to fulfil their role, we have a 
less clear picture as to how British voters want them to do so. This is important for two 
reasons. First, if we do not know what voters want from their MP, we cannot establish 
whether the behaviour of parliamentarians corresponds to the wishes of the people who 
elected them. Finding out what voters want from their local MP will thus help us evaluate the 
health of our democracy.  
Second, knowing more about constituents’ expectations can also help us to understand 
whether the public harbour unrealistic expectations about what are appropriate activities for 
MPs. For example, voters may underestimate the parliamentary workload MPs face and 
expect them to spend almost all their time and energy on constituency service. Studying 
constituent preferences can show what voters see as the key and most desirable duties of MPs.  
In a recent study, we therefore set out to measure what kinds of MPs British voters prefer. 
In an online experiment using a survey technique called conjoint analysis, we asked 
participants to choose a preferred representative from pairs of hypothetical MPs who varied in 
how they acted as representatives, but also in their gender, party and tenure in parliament. By 
observing participants’ choices between different types of MP, we were able to infer which 
MP attributes voters value, and in what ways. 
It may of course be that voters simply have no preferences or expectations regarding what 
their MP does. Many pay little attention even to national politics and may only have a vague 
idea about what MPs in fact do aside from their role as a party representative. In our study, we 
allowed for this possibility by offering participants the ability to choose between hypothetical 
MPs either randomly or based simply on party.  
Yet we found that voters in fact do have clear preferences as to the individual attributes of 
their local MP. Voters prefer MPs who speak out against the party line and who represent the 
wishes of constituents. They also want MPs to spend more than a minimal amount of time on 
constituency issues, preferring MPs who spend three days of a typical working week on 
constituency matters and two days working on national policy. Other characteristics such as 
an MP’s experience or sex matter a lot less to voters. 
 
Our study 
For our study we chose to make use a technique which originated in marketing: choice-based 
conjoint analysis. In such surveys, participants are presented with two or more hypothetical 
options and are then asked which of these they prefer. The technique is often used in studies 
of consumers, where respondents have to indicate their preferred credit card scheme or 
smartphone. The key feature of conjoint analyses is that the choices with which respondents 
are presented have a broad range of characteristics and these characteristics vary randomly.  
In our case, we presented survey participants with profiles of hypothetical MPs who 
varied in the following attributes: their independence from the party line, the source of their 
policy opinions and the time spent on constituency service and national policy work, as well 
as their gender, party and tenure in parliament. Our precise experimental design was as 
follows. After a short introduction, we asked respondents to consider a series of pairs of 
hypothetical MPs, each characterised by several attributes. For example, the MPs could be 
male or female, Conservative or Labour, or speak out against the party never, rarely, 
sometimes or often. Respondents were presented with a total of five choice tasks. 
Respondents’ choices were measured by asking them which of the two persons described they 
would prefer to have as their representative. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of one of our 
surveys. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Conjoint analysis has not previously been used to study what constituents want their 
parliamentary representatives to do. Existing survey research has generally asked respondents 
to rank different activities in terms of perceived importance. In Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina’s 
pioneering study, for example, respondents were requested to rank various activities, 
including ‘Protecting the interests of the constituency’; ‘Keeping in touch with the people 
about what the government is doing’; ‘Helping people in the constituency who have personal 
problems with the government’; ‘Debating and voting in Parliament’; and ‘Keeping track of 
civil servants’.3 Another approach has been to ask survey participants to rate the importance 
of different activities. So, respondents might be asked to assign a score measuring how 
important they think it is that MPs spend time on constituency service. Finally, many surveys 
have also asked respondents to choose a preferred role for MPs. For instance, participants 
have been requested to decide whether, when deciding how to vote in parliament, MPs should 
follow their own conscience, the party line or the wishes of their constituency. 
Each of these approaches is undoubtedly informative, but conjoint analyses have some 
important advantages. Because of their design, we can isolate the effect of different attributes. 
It might be, for example, that voters say they want their MP to spend time on constituency 
work because this also increases the likelihood that he or she will take constituency wishes 
into account when voting in parliament. By including various attributes in our hypothetical 
profiles, we can be more certain that we are capturing the effect of one specific attribute and 
not that of other, related characteristics. So, we can check whether voters simply view an 
attribute as a proxy for other MP characteristics. 
Moreover, our design means that we can use the choices of respondents to understand 
which characteristics are seen as important and how each attribute affects decisions. For our 
study of MPs, this means that we can learn how much weight, if any, citizens place on 
different activities and attributes when asked to simultaneously consider other legislator 
attributes such as party affiliation, gender or work experience. So, we can test explanations for 
voter preferences at the same time as examining whether voters have any preferences over a 
legislator attribute at all. If we instead asked respondents to rank or rate attributes, social 
desirability may make it less likely for respondents to choose to say that a characteristic is 
simply not important to them. 
Another advantage of conjoint analyses is that respondents are not asked to assess 
individual activities or attributes in isolation. Instead, they are provided with relatively 
rounded and complex hypothetical profiles. This means that the choices are at least somewhat 
realistic, which means it is more likely that our findings will transfer to the ‘real world’ 
beyond the survey situation.  
In sum, conjoint analyses enable us to measure preferences as to single aspects of 
representative behaviour while also embedding voters’ choices in a multidimensional setting, 
which allows us to assess how important each aspect is relative to the other attributes of the 
representatives.  
 
MP activities and behaviour 
The first MP activity we examined in our study was independence from the party line. The 
extent to which MPs are loyal to their party is a key attribute of parliamentary representatives. 
There are many ways in which representatives can register their disagreement with the party 
line. Perhaps the most well-known among researchers and journalists is parliamentary 
rebellion, i.e. casting a vote in parliament that differs from that recommended by the party. 
Among political scientists, this has generally been the main way in which the independence of 
MPs has been measured, and rebellions can also receive a lot of coverage in the media. 
Nowadays, interested constituents can look up how their MP voted on websites such as 
theyworkforyou.com. Nevertheless, parliamentary voting is just one way in which MPs can 
register their disagreement: for example, they can also sign critical Early Day Motions or 
speak out in the media or at public meetings. 
 What might constituents expect from their MP in terms of political independence? We 
think it is very likely that constituents are highly in favour of independent MPs.
4
 For one, 
parties are very unpopular in Britain, so any action that distances MPs from parties will be 
viewed positively. By acting independently, MPs can signal that they have principles and are 
trustworthy, so constituents may see speaking out against the party as an indication of other 
positive candidate characteristics. 
 However, not all constituents may support parliamentary independence. Those MPs 
who speak out too much may be seen as troublesome meddlers, especially if they rebel 
against a party the constituent supports. A diehard Conservative supporter’s approval of Tory 
rebels will have its limits. The reason why the MP is speaking out may also be important: is 
this in favour of policies I support or that benefit my constituency?  
 In our study, we measured independence from the party line in two ways. In our first 
survey, we stated how often the hypothetical MP speaks out or votes against the party 
leadership: never, rarely, sometimes or often. In our second survey, our fictional 
parliamentarians differed in whether they spoke out behind closed doors or also in public. 
Real-world representatives may often decide to speak out only privately. Many parties allow 
such private dissent, and it is an important way in which legislators can try to influence the 
party line. Thus, our hypothetical MPs could: not speak out; speak out only at internal party 
meetings; or speak out both at such meetings and also publicly. 
A related attribute of MPs is when they decide to be independent. In our second study, 
we therefore also measured the source of policy opinions, where we stated whether, when 
considering policy matters, the hypothetical MP thinks about his or her own views or those of 
his or her constituents. This is related to an important question concerning the preferred 
representational role of MPs. When making decisions, should they follow their own 
conscience (thus acting as ‘trustees’) or the wishes of their constituents (‘delegates’)?  
 In addition to independence from the party line, a second fundamental decision that 
every legislator makes is over the allocation of limited resources in terms of time and energy 
to national policy work and constituency service, respectively. It is well known that the dual 
role of a parliamentary representative creates important tensions. In the United States, Fenno 
noted the conflict between the need to work on matters of national policy and to help 
constituents with important requests.
5
 Surveys of legislators have provided researchers with 
good-quality information on how MPs tend to address this trade-off. For example, recent 
evidence shows that British MPs spend about fourteen hours per week on constituency work, 
which is more than MPs in most other European countries, including Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Spain.
6
  
 Again, we know far less about how constituents would like MPs to address the trade-
off; indeed, we know less about this than about expectations concerning independence. 
However, our expectation when we began our study was that constituents would want high 
levels of constituency service. Distrust of parties and Parliament is high, so voters might 
prefer their MP to be involved in hands-on work supporting the constituency.
7
 Constituents 
who are relatively informed about how Westminster works will also know that MPs generally 
do not have much individual influence on legislation, so they might prefer their MP to be 
active in ways where he or she will be more likely to make a difference, so in the 
constituency. In doing so, MPs might do more to help the constituent or affect the situation in 
the constituency than if they focused on legislative policy-making. 
In both surveys, we therefore stated the amount of time spent on constituency or national 
policy work by the hypothetical MPs. This captures how the MP allocates effort to each of the 
two activities. This was measured by stating the number of days of a five-day week spent 
working on local constituency issues, with the remaining days spent reviewing and working 
on national policies in Parliament. This formulation makes the trade-off between the two 
types of activity explicit while not presenting either in an obviously positive light. 
In addition to an MP’s independence from the party and their time spent on constituency 
versus Westminster activities, we also presented respondents with information on other MP 
attributes.  
We also varied the party affiliation of the MPs (Labour or Conservative). This is one MP 
characteristic about which voters are likely to have very strong preferences. For Labour 
supporters, the key thing about an MP might be that he or she is also Labour-affiliated. 
Indeed, party affiliation may overpower any other attribute of an MP, making it a key 
characteristic to include in our descriptions of hypothetical MPs. We also varied the gender of 
the hypothetical MPs to examine whether voters had a bias toward having a male or female 
representative. Finally, we varied the tenure in parliament of the hypothetical MPs (three, ten 
or twenty-one years) to examine whether voters preferred to have an experienced 
representative, all else equal. 
Our first survey was fielded between 5 and 6 December 2012 to 1,899 respondents. The 
second was fielded between 24 and 25 September 2013 to 1,919 respondents. For both 
surveys, YouGov drew a sub-sample from its online panel of over 360,000 British adults, 
ensuring the sample was representative of British adults in terms of age, gender, social class 
and type of newspaper readership. 
 
 
Findings 
Our findings are presented graphically in Figure 2, which shows the effect of different levels 
of each attribute on the probability of choosing a hypothetical MP. The note under the Figure 
explains in more detail how it should be interpreted.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
In detail, the results are as follows: 
 
Independence from the party line: We find that voters like MPs who disagree with the party 
leadership. Those MPs who rarely speak out or vote against the party are about 13 per cent 
more likely to be chosen by respondents than those who never do so, while those who do so 
sometimes or often are more than 30 per cent more likely to be chosen. Public disagreement is 
valued more than raising concerns privately. Those MPs who speak out internally are almost 
15 per cent more likely to be chosen than those who do not speak out at all, while those MPs 
who speak out internally and publicly are more than 20 per cent more likely to be chosen than 
MPs who do not voice their opposition at all. 
 
Source of policy opinions: Voters clearly prefer MPs who represent the wishes of constituents 
over those who follow their own beliefs and principles. MPs who think about their 
constituents’ views are more than 20 per cent more likely to be chosen than MPs who think 
about their own views. 
 
Time spent on constituency or national policy work: Constituents want their parliamentary 
representative to work hard—but not exclusively—on local constituency issues. MPs who 
spend three days on constituency work and two days on national policy are preferred most. 
However, all MPs who spend at least two days on constituency work are strongly preferred to 
those who just spend one day a week on that activity. This was measured in both surveys and 
the patterns are almost identical. 
 
Gender: There is no clear effect of the gender of the MP: neither male nor female MPs are 
clearly preferred in survey 1, while a woman MP is slightly preferred in survey 2. 
 
Tenure in parliament: The effect of parliamentary experience is small at most, with MPs with 
twenty-one years in parliament slightly preferred over those who have been in parliament for 
just three years. 
 
Party: Labour MPs are slightly preferred to Conservative MPs, in line with poll results at the 
time of the surveys. In analyses we do not show here, we also find that, unsurprisingly, 
Labour and Conservative supporters strongly prefer the MP to be from their own party. 
 
Implications 
Our study shows that voters care about more than just the party label of their MP. Instead, we 
now have evidence that constituents distinguish between types of activity and can say how 
they prefer their MP to behave. Specifically, it appears that citizens want MPs who are not 
beholden to the party line but who demonstrate individuality. MPs who represent constituency 
preferences are viewed more positively than those who evaluate policies based more on their 
own personal principles. Finally, constituents want their MP to work hard to represent their 
constituency, but not to such an extent that national policy work is not valued.  
In sum, constituents want a Parliament that is made up of strong-minded, independent 
MPs who see themselves mainly as representatives of their constituency. Such a Parliament 
would of course weaken the role of national political parties, who depend on a strong, unified 
party line to implement their political promises. This presents an important dilemma for party 
leaders. On the one hand, encouraging their MPs to demonstrate their independence might 
increase the popularity of the party in the constituency and thus its electoral chances. On the 
other, such a group of MPs would make it a lot harder to push through political change and 
present a unified programme to voters. Homogenous national parties are important to enable 
voters to choose between alternative governments, not just between different constituency 
candidates.  
In the end, there are thus limits to the extent to which parties can and perhaps should let 
their MPs be independent. This means that the expectations of voters are perhaps not 
reconcilable with the current British institutional arrangements. The only solutions available 
are to change these institutional arrangements (unlikely) or to communicate more effectively 
why party loyalty may be necessary for effective and efficient governing (difficult). In the 
end, we may simply have to accept a certain level of voter dissatisfaction with the party 
loyalty of MPs.  
In contrast, when it comes to MPs’ time spent on constituency and national policy work, 
our study also shows that voters are more realistic in their expectations. Their preference is 
for a three-day/two-day split between the two activities. This in fact matches the average time 
allocation of the 2010 intake of MPs, who, in a recent study by the Hansard Society, reported 
spending 60 per cent of their time on constituency work and 40 per cent on Westminster 
work.
8
  
In our experiments, we looked at how respondents react to different types of MPs in 
simplified scenarios. This means that our findings cannot be directly applied to choices at the 
ballot box. At election time, vote choice may be more influenced by partisan considerations 
and by concerns about who should lead the government. Moreover, we provided very clear 
information to our respondents about MP characteristics, and this is not always as easily 
available in real-world situations.  
However, even if the magnitude of the effects of MPs’ activities is likely to be smaller in 
an election, our results tell us how each MP attribute may affect vote choice. For example, 
voters are unlikely to reward an almost exclusive focus on constituency service more than a 
moderate focus on that activity. The Westminster work of an MP is not unpopular per se, as 
long it does not become the sole activity of the MP. We also have evidence that moderately 
independent MPs are seen almost as positively as very independent ones. So, our survey gives 
us more information about what voters want than we could glean simply from looking at and 
comparing election results and the profiles and activities of MPs. 
Finally, there is still more work to be done on what voters want from their MPs. To 
simplify the design of our experiments, we have used comparisons between two sitting MPs. 
A more realistic situation is that voters have to choose between an incumbent and a 
challenger, and future studies could look at which information and characteristics voters then 
make use of. Furthermore, there are many other MP attributes to consider. For instance, 
candidates for office differ in their local roots and social background, attributes we have 
ignored in this study. In other words, there is still more to discover about what kinds of 
candidates and MPs voters want.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Screenshot from the conjoint analysis study 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Survey results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These plots show the results of the two studies. MP attributes are listed down the left 
hand side of each plot. Each bar compares the support for MPs with one level of an attribute 
versus those with another level of the attribute. For example, the top bar in the left-hand plot 
shows that respondents were 13 per cent more likely to choose an MP who ‘rarely’ dissents 
against his or her party than an MP who ‘never’ does so. The black lines show the margin of 
error for each comparison. If the black line crosses zero, we cannot be confident that there is 
any difference in levels of support for the two types of MP. 
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